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iv

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
EXCLUDING SHOULTZ'S EXPERT WITNESSES.
Should this Court reverse the trial court's ruling which granted Charles Shoultz's
("Shoultz") motion for J.N.O.V. and alternative motion for a new trial, then Shoultz is entitled to
a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Shoultz's expert witnesses.
The trial court excluded Shoultz's expert testimony for two reasons: (1) Shoultz failed to
designate any witnesses as experts prior to trial; and (2) the experts could not "give opinions as
to what took place, with them not being there, and they're not being [sic] able to say what took
place." (R. 341-42, 433, 441-42). Both reasons given by the trial court for the exclusion of
Shoultz's witnesses amounted to an abuse of discretion.
First, the trial court never imposed a deadline for the designation of expert witnesses.
Even without such a judicial deadline, Gary Ricci ("Ricci") possessed notice over six weeks
prior to trial that Shoultz planned on calling Snowbird employees as witnesses. The trial was
held on March 11, 12 and 13, 1996. (R. 150-51, 209). On January 30, 1996, Shoultz's counsel
mailed Ricci's counsel a letter in which the Snowbird employees were identified as witnesses.
(See Correspondence of counsel attached in addendum). That notice gave Ricci's counsel an
opportunity to depose the Snowbird employees, particularly Kenneth Bonar ("Bonar"). Those
depositions occurred on February 20, 1996, nearly three weeks after Shoultz's counsel identified
the Snowbird employees as witnesses. (See R. 120-29; 329-34). At the depositions Bonar
testified in detail concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code. He opined that Ricci failed to
1

adhere to the code, and that his failure to do so caused the accident. (R. 333-34). Ricci had
ample notice pertaining to Shoultz's attempt to elicit expert testimony at trial from the Snowbird
employees.
Second, under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the witnesses did not need to see the
skiing accident in order to testify about the application and interpretation of the Skier's
Responsibility Code to the facts of the case. Utah R. Evid. 703 (1997). Instead, Shoultz's expert
witnesses could have offered testimony as to the application and interpretation of the code based
on the respective version of events presented by both Ricci and Shoultz at trial. Utah R. Evid.
702-705 (1997). As explained in further detail below, because the trial court's abuse of
discretion pertaining to the exclusion of Shoultz's expert witnesses did not amount to harmless
error, Shoultz is entitled to a new trial.

A. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
UNDER A "CASE MANAGEMENT" ANALYSIS.
A trial court may not exceed its procedural authority in making case management
decisions governed by the rules of civil procedure. Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R..
830 P.2d 291, 296-97 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). In making
those decisions with respect to the exclusion of witnesses, this Court has recognized that a trial
court must be cautious. The exclusion of a witness from testifying is "extreme in nature and
should be employed only with caution and restraint." Id. at 293 (quoting Plonkey v. Superior,
475 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. 1970). Accordingly, this Court has held that absent a specific order
which creates a judicially imposed deadline for the designation of witnesses, a court abuses its
2

discretion when it excludes expert testimony on the basis that a party did not designate such. Id.
at 296.
In other words, the trial court's decision to exclude Shoultz's expert witnesses was a
case management decision. That decision was governed by the rules of procedure. However, the
trial court exceeded its procedural authority granted by the rules when it excluded Shoultz's
witnesses when no scheduling order was in place which created "a specific deadline for the
disclosure of the final witness list." Id- at 296-97.
The parties do not dispute that the trial court never imposed a deadline for the
designation of expert witnesses. (See Reply Br. of Appellee at 21). The trial court excluded
Shoultz's expert witnesses, in part, because Shoultz failed to designate the Snowbird employees
as experts. (R. 433). Likewise, the court stated that Ricci "was entitled to have notice of expert
witnesses, and entitled to find his own experts if he chose to do s o , . . . " (R. 433). The record
shows, however, that Ricci possessed notice over six weeks prior to the trial that Shoultz planned
on proffering expert testimony. (See R. 120-129; 329-34; Correspondence of counsel attached as
addendum).
The deposition of Kenneth Bonar ("Bonar") was taken on February 20, 1996.
Bonar's deposition was taken by Ricci three weeks after Shoultz identified him as a witness to be
called at trial. (Correspondence of counsel attached as addendum). Bonar is the Mountain
Manager at Snowbird and is responsible for the overall operation of the ski resort. (R. 789). At
his deposition, Bonar was asked whether he had formulated any opinions as to the cause of the

3

accident and whether the parties had violated the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 331-32).
Bonar testified in depth concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code. He opined that Ricci failed
to adhere to the code, and that his failure to do so caused the accident. (R. 333-34). That is,
Ricci failed to (1) "[s]ki under control and in such a manner that [he could] stop or avoid other
skiers . . . . " ; and (2) as the uphill or overtaking skier, Ricci had a duty to avoid Shoultz who was
below Ricci. Id. These opinions, of course, represent expert testimony.
Two weeks later, on March 8, 1996, Ricci filed a motion in limine to exclude
Shoultz's expert testimony. (R. 120-29). No where in that motion or accompanying
memorandum did Ricci claim that he would not have a chance to retain and prepare his own
expert for trial purposes. Instead, Ricci argued that the expert testimony should be excluded for
evidentiary purposes, not because of any lack of notice. (R. 120-29). Shoultz identified the
Snowbird employees as witnesses on January 30, 1996. That identification gave Ricci ample
opportunity to depose the Snowbird employees concerning their opinions as to the cause of the
accident and the applicability of the Skiers Responsibility Code. Ricci cannot claim any surprise
by Shoultz attempting to elicit expert testimony from the Snowbird employees, particularly
Bonar. (See Reply Br. of Appellee at 21; R. 433).
The trial court abused its discretion in excluding Bonar's expert testimony under a
case management decision, which was governed by the rules of procedure. No express deadline
was set as to the designation of expert witnesses. Even without an express deadline, Ricci

4

possessed notice prior to trial that Shoultz would elicit expert opinion pertaining to the Skier's
Responsibility Code and its application to the respective versions of the accident in this case.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
UNDER AN EVIDENTIARY RULING ANALYSIS.
The trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the expert testimony on the
basis that Shoultz could not lay appropriate foundation. Prior to trial and pursuant to Rule 103 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence1, Shoultz made a proffer as to Bonar's expert testimony. (R. 43234). Shoultz indicated that Bonar would be qualified as an expert because of Bonar's
knowledge, training and experience. (R. 432-435); see also Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329,
1327 (Utah 1993)("formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving expert opinion,
and a witness may qualify as an expert by virtue of his experience or training."). Bonar was
Snowbird's Mountain Manager. Prior to that, he was employed as the ski patrol director and
assistant mountain manager. (R. 789-90). As such, Bonar was extremely well qualified to
render an opinion as to the enforcement, interpretation and application of the code to the facts of
the ski accident.
In his proffer, Shoultz also indicated that Bonar, because of his training and
experience, would testify that there are generally accepted rules of conduct in skiing. Those rules
of conduct are embodied in written form and published by the skiing industry as the Skier's

1

Ricci's assertion in his Reply Brief that Shoultz made no proffer of the subject
testimony is clearly incorrect. The "substantial right" requirement of Rule 103 will be discussed
infra Point II of this brief.
5

Responsibility Code. (R. 434). Shoultz indicated that a ski accident is not the same situation as
an automobile accident, where the jury may be expected to be familiar with the rules as far as
operating motor vehicles. Accordingly, Bonar would have been able to testify about the accepted
standard of care and how that standard was breached under the facts of this case. That testimony
would have been helpful in assisting the jury reach a verdict on the ultimate issue which was
whether Ricci or Shoultz was negligent. (R. 434-35).
Ricci argues that expert testimony pertaining to the application of the Skier's
Responsibility Code would not have been "helpful" to the jury. (Reply Br. of Appellee at 22).
However, the scope of Rule 702 is broad. Prior to the enactment of the rules of evidence, some
courts rejected expert testimony unless it related to an issue "not within the common knowledge
of the average layman."

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL

§ 13.02[2] (1991).

Such an interpretation, however, is incompatible with the helpfulness standard of Rule 702. Id.
There is no bright line separating issues within the comprehension of jurors from those that are
not. Therefore, experts may be able to "add specialized knowledge that would be helpful" even
when jurors are well equipped to make judgments based on their common experience. Id.
Ricci also argues that the expert testimony would not have been "helpful" because
the experts never "saw Ricci before the accident, and none saw the accident." (Reply Br. of
Appellee at 22). The trial court, as part of its ruling, erroneously relied upon that argument.
However, Bonar did not need to see the skiing accident in order to testify about the application
and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of the case. Utah R. of Evid.

6

703-705 (1997); £f. Shurtleffv. JavTuft & Co.. 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980)(expert who
previously worked on backhoe could testify that backhoe had been maintained in a proper
condition by defendant even though the expert never observed, nor did he have personal
knowledge of, any specific acts by defendant that would constitute improper maintenance).
Here, Bonar could have testified that Ricci, as the "uphill" skier, had a duty to avoid
the downhill skier, and Ricci's failure to do so was the cause of the accident. Bonar's testimony
could have assisted the jury in helping them determine what it means to be the "uphill" skier.
Likewise, he could have assisted the jury in helping them determine what it means, according to
the code, to "ski in control" and in such a manner so as to avoid other downhill skiers.
Moreover, Bonar could have offered testimony as to the application of the code based upon the
two versions of events presented at trial by both Ricci and Shoultz. In such a manner, his
testimony would have added specialized knowledge that would be "helpful" although some of
the jurors may have been well equipped to make judgments based on their common experience
of skiing. Again, however, skiing represents a sport in which not all jurors will be familiar, even
in Utah. The testimony would have been relevant to the ultimate issue and helpful to the jury in
making its determination.
In turn, Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence indicate that the facts upon which
an expert bases an opinion may be "made known to the expert at or before the hearing." So long
as the facts are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field" the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence. Utah R. Evid. 703 (1997). Thus, although Bonar's
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opinions could have been elicited through the use of hypothetical questions, See Utah Dept. of
Trans, v. 6200 South Associates. 872 P.2d 462 (Utah App. 1994) cert denied. 890 P.2d 1034
(Utah 1994), such procedure would not have been mandatory. Further, it may not have been
necessary for Bonar to even give the reasons for his opinions or inferences. The reasons for his
opinion could have been explored by Ricci on cross-examination. Utah R. Evid. 705 (1997); see
also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 6272
(West 1997)(In the name of efficiency, Rules 703 and 705 shift the burden to the cross-examiner
to reveal the bases of an expert's opinion and the deficiencies therein). Any deficiencies that
Ricci may have perceived would have gone to the weight of the evidence, so long as Bonar's
opinions pertaining to the Skier's Responsibility Code were reliable. See Utah R. of Evid. 702
(1997).
Finally, Ricci argues that the expert testimony would not have been "helpful"
because Bonar's testimony would merely "tell the jury what result to reach." (Reply Br. of
Appellee at 23). Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly provides that testimony in the
form of opinion or inference "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704 (1997). In this respect, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated:
The old shibboleth that an expert should not be permitted to invade the
province of the jury has been largely displaced by recognition that
opinions, if based on an adequate foundation, are helpful and that the
powerful tool of cross-examination and the jury's good judgment are
sufficient to place the opinion in proper perspective.

8

Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah 1979). Unfortunately, the jury here was
never able to place the expert opinion in the "proper perspective."
Of course, "an expert cannot give an opinion as to whether an individual was
'negligent' because such an opinion would require a legal conclusion." Davidson v. Prince. 813
P.2d 1225,1231 (Utah App. 1991). cert denied. 826 P2d 681 (Utah 1991) (the excluded
testimony was an answer to a specific question which would appear on the verdict form).
However, "there is no bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that
call for over-broad legal responses." Id.
In this case, Bonar would have testified that, in his expert opinion, Ricci failed to
adhere to the Skier's Responsibility Code. That proposed testimony is significantly different
from the scenario embraced by this Court in Davidson and State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah
App. 1996), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996) (expert testified that under Utah law,
defendant's actions were impermissible). In this case, both parties recognize that violation of the
Skier's Responsibility Code would not have been conclusive on the standard of care. (Reply Br.
of Appellee at 18 n. 5). The jury instructions, too, indicated that the code was evidence of the
"care an ordinary, prudent person would use under the circumstances." (R. 232). Thus, Bonar
could have testified that Ricci breached the ski industry's accepted standard of care as
promulgated in the Skier's Responsibility Code. Such testimony, although embracing an
ultimate issue, would not have merely told the jury what result to reach. It would have been
proper under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Godesky v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d
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541 (Utah 1984)(experts testified that defendant violated four provisions of National Electric
Safety Code; violation of such was evidence of negligence); Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v.
Fitzgerald. 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978)(violation of statute is evidence of negligence); Hall v.
Archer-Daniel-Midland Co. 491 N.E.2d 879 (111. App. 1986), rev'd on other grnds.. 524 N.E.2d
586 (111. 1988)(expert properly permitted to testify that defendants violated a duty to plaintiff
under OSHA regulations).

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PREJUDICED
SHOULTZ
This Court has recognized that it is not easy to tell when an error should be regarded
as prejudicial. Berrett 830 P.2d at 293. This Court has, however, reasoned that "if we cannot,
with any degree of assurance, affirm that the use of such evidence would not have been helpful to
the [defendant], the doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing him to have a full and fair
presentation of his cause to the jury." Id. Although not determinative2, some indication of the
prejudicial effect of the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony must "be found in the fact that
counsel thought the matter of sufficient consequence that he objected to the admission of the
evidence." Berrett, 830 P.2d at 297 (quoting Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp..
318 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah 1957)); (See R. 120, 427, 791).

2

See Macris & Associates Inc. v. Images & Attitudes. Inc.. 941 P.2d 636, 643 (Utah App.

1997)
10

One thing is clear from the record: The jury was not able to hear Bonar's ultimate
conclusion that Ricci violated important skiing rules as published in the Skier's Responsibility
Code. The exclusion of such expert opinion invited "misunderstanding [and] confusion in the
jurors' minds that may not be detectable or correctable . . . . " Edwards. 597 P.2d at 1330. The
jury was allowed to speculate in an area in which it was not as knowledgeable as an expert. See
id. The jury never heard expert opinion testimony concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code's
application to a "downhill skier" as opposed to an "uphill skier." (R. 793-94). The jury never
heard expert testimony concerning the code provision with respect to "loss of control," or that
"loss of control" does not mean merely falling while skiing.3 In other words, the jury had to
interpret and apply the "rules" of the sport without the aid of an expert who was extremely
knowledgeable regarding to the application and interpretation of those rules. Skiing is not a
sport in which all jurors have a common knowledge. The jury, therefore, was left to speculate on
whether "loss of control" meant merely falling while skiing rather than skiing out-of-control or
recklessly. See Edwards. 597 P.2d at 1330.
In his Reply Brief, Ricci argues that Shoultz could have argued his interpretation of
the code to the jury in closing arguments. (Reply Br. of Appellee at 24 n. 11). Such an assertion
is incorrect. Shoultz's arguments concerning any interpretation of the code to the facts of the

3

In his Reply Brief, Ricci claims that Shoultz did not fall. However, the record clearly
indicates that, according to Ricci's version, Shoultz "caught an edge," veered to his left and
began to fall. (R. 589). Ricci testified, "It seemed like it was only one second. It was fast. He
just had trouble and he was going down." Id- For purposes of this Reply Brief and Shoultz's
original brief, beginning to fall, and actually falling, are the same thing.
11

case would have been objectionable because such an interpretation was not in evidence. (See R.
214). In other words, the trial court's ruling which excluded expert testimony regarding the
application of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of this case precluded Shoultz's
counsel from arguing his interpretation to the jury. In sum, accurate fact-finding was not
enhanced by the exclusion of Shoultz's expert testimony. Because this Court cannot, "with any
degree of assurance/' affirm that the use of expert testimony would not have been helpful to
Shoultz's case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing him to have a "full and fair
presentation of his cause to the jury." Berrett, 830 P.2d at 297.
CONCLUSION
Shoultz was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling which excluded expert testimony
concerning the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code. Such testimony
would have been helpful in assisting the jury to reach its ultimate conclusion. Therefore, if this
Court reverses the trial court's ruling on Shoultz's motion for J.N.O.V. or alternative new trial,
Shoultz respectfully requests that this Court order a new trial because the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding expert testimony and Shoultz was prejudiced by that erroneous ruling.
DATED this 2 l day of February, 1998.
STRONG & HANNI

Paul M. Belnap
Robert L. Janicki
Darren K. Nelson
Attorneys for Appellee & Cross-Appellant
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JLJAPIS,

GRAY & STEGALL, ^.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
175 WEST 200 SOUTH. SUITE 2004

PAUL H. LIAPIS
DEAN L. GRAY
WILLIAM A. STEGALL. JR.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

TELECOPIER
(801)532-7394

TELEPHONE (801)532-6996

January 30, 1996

Jeffrey D. Eisenberg
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

RE:

Gary Ricci

v. Charles

Shoultz,

M.D.

Civil No. 940930267PI
Fireman's Fund Claim No. B790L94022888
Dear Jeff:
At the direction of Dr. Shoultz1 insurance carrier, Fireman's Fund, I have filed with the court an offer of judgment in
the amount of $3,000. A copy of the offer is enclosed.
I request that you provide responses or supplemental responses with regard to the following discovery requests:
1.
Defendant's interrogatory 4(d) requested
information concerning Mr. Riccifs claimed medical
expenses. In his answers dated August 10, 1994, he
responded that "plaintiff is not in possession of bills
at this time and reserves the right to supplement this
answer to interrogatory. It is my understanding from
Mr. Ricci's testimony at his continued deposition on
January 24, 1996, that he has not had any medical
treatment related to the claimed injuries for several
months. Accordingly, he should be in possession of any
and all bills relating to treatment of the injuries he
claims to have suffered in this accident. Please
furnish copies of all such bills to me as soon as
possible.
2.
Defendant's interrogatory 7 related to Mr.
Ricci's gross income as reported for federal income tax
purposes for the years 1989 through 1993. At Mr.
Ricci's deposition on February 14, 1995, you stated you
would provide to me copies of the tax return for 1989
through 1993. (Ricci depo. page 15, line 23, 24.) At
the continued deposition, you indicated you would
provide a copy of Mr. Ricci's 1994 tax return to me.
Please furnish copies of all of the requested tax
returns as soon as possible. Additionally, if Mr.
Ricci intends to claim any loss of income in 1995, I
would appreciate receiving documentation concerning his
income in that year.

Jeffrey D. Eisen. 3rg
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
January 30, 1996
Page 2
3.
Defendant's interrogatory 14 asked whether
you had hired "any experts to determine the cause of
the incident or to reconstruct the incident. " You
objected to the interrogatory as work-product, but,
without waiving the objection, stated "none at this
time," Please advise me as to whether your response to
interrogatory 14 remains accurate.
Following Mr. Riccifs deposition, you requested that we each
identify our trial witnesses by February 7, 1996. I presently
anticipate that I will, or may, call the following:
1.

Plaintiff.

2.

Defendant.

3.

Jennifer Ricci.

4.

Gary Pinnell.

5.

Patrick Kenny.

6.

Karl Boyer.

7.

Bob Bonar.

8.
J. K. Etheridge, defendant's treating orthopedic surgeon.
9.
Stephen J. Nicolatus, an economist, to address plaintiff's lost earnings/earning capacity
claims.
10. Any individual who provided medical/health
care treatment to plaintiff on and after April 12,
1994.
I have attempted to make the foregoing list of trial witnesses as complete as possible, but there may be changes once Mr.
Ricci responds to the discovery requests.
Very truly yours,

William A. Stegall, Jr,
WAS/tt
cc: Richard K. Rediger
Charles Shoultz, M.D.
Vance Dunnam

WILCOX,

DEWSNUP

<& K I N G

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW
2 0 2 0 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
3 6 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT
TELEPHONE
(SOI) 5 3 3 - 0 4 0 0
FACSIMILE
(SOI) 3 6 3 - 4 2 1 8

LAKE CITY, UTAH

February 2,1996

8*111

W. B R E N T W I L C O X
R A L P H L. D E W S N U P
C O L I N P. K I N G
D A V I D R. O L S E N
E D W A R D B. H A V A S
J E F F R E Y D. E I S E N B E R G
RUTH LYBBERT
A L A N W. M O R T E N S E N *
•ALSO ADMITTED IN WYOMING
AND COLORADO

William Stegall, Esq.
Liapis, Gray & Stegall
175 West 200 South #2004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE: Ricci v. Shoultz
Dear Bill:
Thanks for your letter of January 30, 1996 which contained your witness list. I
attempted to located J.K. Ethridge in the Salt Lake physicians directory and could not
locate him. I am assuming he is someone who treated your client for his alleged
injuries in Texas.
To begin with, I would like to know what relevant testimony Mr. Ethridge has to
offer. Your client has not made a claim for damages in this case. If you believe that
the type and location of your client's injuries is relevant to determining the cause of the
accident, I have no difficulty with your client putting that evidence in and in fact, I
probably would not object to introduction of medical records to substantiate that.
However, if Mr. Ethridge is going to opine on how the accident happened, I certainly
want the opportunity to take his deposition and voir dire him. I think it would be very
unlikely he could ever be qualified to testify concerning the cause of the accident. In
any event, please clarify your intentions and make arrangements to give me the
opportunity to depose Mr. Ethridge at a convenient time prior to trial.
truly yours,

JDE:sk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this i i _ day of February, 1998, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellee & Cross-Appellant was mailed,first-classpostage
prepaid, to:
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
36 South State, #2020
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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